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Abstract 
 
Title III of the JOBS Act took effect in May 2016 
and it began a new chapter in equity crowdfunding in 
the United States by providing an opportunity for 
entrepreneurial ventures to solicit funding from non-
accredited investors. Due to the relative novelty, little 
is known about factors that can affect equity 
crowdfunding success under Title III. To address this 
gap in research, we draw on the risk capital 
framework and we examine the effects of market, 
execution and agency risks in equity crowdfunding 
under Title III. We collect data on 133 ventures that 
attracted more than $11 million in funding 
commitments across sixteen Title III equity 
crowdfunding platforms. We find that all three types 
of risks can affect the likelihood of successful 
fundraising under Title III. We discuss the 
implications of these findings for entrepreneurs, 
investors, crowdfunding platforms and policy makers.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Equity crowdfunding refers to the process of 
raising funds for entrepreneurial ventures, typically 
via Internet-based platforms, whereby investors 
receive equity in exchange for capital [42]. Equity 
crowdfunding is distinct from rewards-based 
crowdfunding. In rewards-based crowdfunding, 
project backers provide funds to early stage 
entrepreneurial projects, typically in exchange for a 
discount on the planned product, but receive no 
equity in the project. For example, Oculus Rift raised 
over $2.4 million on Kickstarter [14], a rewards-
based crowdfunding platform, through pre-orders for 
the virtual reality headset, but the individual backers 
received no equity in the company and they did not 
benefit from the $2.3 billion acquisition of the 
company by Facebook [11]. 
Equity crowdfunding was explicitly prohibited in 
the United States prior to the passage of the JOBS 
Act in 2012 [40]. The JOBS Act sought to make it 
easier for entrepreneurs to raise funding and it 
contains several provisions. Title II of the JOBS Act 
became effective in 2013 and it relaxed the rules 
concerning public investment solicitation from 
accredited investors [41]. Accredited investors are 
individuals who either have income exceeding 
$200,000 per year or have at least $1 million in 
assets, excluding the primary residence [39]. 
Preliminary research on Title II equity crowdfunding 
shows that over $1.4 billion have been committed by 
accredited investors to Title II projects [26], however 
much less is known about Title III. 
Title III of the JOBS Act expanded permissible 
equity crowdfunding to include the general public 
[18]. Title III allows companies to raise up to $1 
million from accredited and non-accredited investors 
over a 12-month period and it allows individual non-
accredited investors to commit up to $2,000 a year to 
equity crowdfunded projects if the person’s income is 
less than $100,000 a year and up to $10,000 if the 
person’s income is above $100,000 [18].  
Investor participation in early stage venture 
financing exposes the investors to many risks [43]. 
Concerns about individual non-accredited investor 
protections delayed the implementation of Title III 
provisions until May 2016 [18]. A theoretical 
evaluation of Title III legislation suggested that Title 
III would likely fail due to information asymmetry 
and adverse selection problems [7], yet little is 
known about the actual state of affairs across Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms. This is the research 
gap that we begin to address in the present study.  
We analyze 133 projects across sixteen Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms that sought to raise 
funding in the period between May 2016 and 
February 2017. In addition to providing empirical 
evidence that entrepreneurial ventures can be 
successful in raising funds under Title III, we also 
examine the effects of market, execution and agency 
risks on venture fundraising success in Title III 
equity crowdfunding. Our results reveal that all three 
types of risks can affect the success of fundraising in 
Title III platforms.  
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as 
follows. First, we provide an overview of prior 
research on equity crowdfunding. Next, we draw on 
research in risk capital investments and we develop 
the research framework in our study. We then 
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describe the data and our analytical methodology, 
and we present the results. We conclude with a 
discussion of emergent insights and implications of 
our findings for entrepreneurs, investors, 
crowdfunding platforms and policy makers. 
 
2. Equity crowdfunding literature review 
 
Equity crowdfunding is distinct from other types 
of crowdfunding that exist, in that it allows backers 
to receive an equity stake in the company. Generally, 
four types of crowdfunding are recognized: rewards-
based, equity-based, loan-based and donation-based. 
Rewards-based crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to 
raise funding by enabling project backers to pre-order 
a product or service that is being developed. 
Rewards-based crowdfunding has always been legal 
in the United States, Famously, Joseph Pulitzer, the 
publisher of New York World, led a crowdfunding 
campaign to build the pedestal for the Statue of 
Liberty and successfully raised funding from 160,000 
contributors in 1885 [36].  
IndieGogo and KickStarter were among the first 
platforms to leverage the Internet to expand the reach 
of rewards-based crowdfunding and they have 
brokered over $3 billion in funding commitments 
since launch [19]. There is an active stream of 
research exploring factors that affect the success of 
projects hosted on these platforms [22,31,32], 
however these studies do not necessarily yield useful 
insights for equity-based crowdfunding, because 
investor motivations for participation in equity-based 
crowdfunding platforms are very different from 
backers in rewards-based crowdfunding [5]. Equity 
investors are typically motivated by the expected 
gains in the value of their investments, as opposed to 
receiving a product or service from a rewards-based 
project. 
Loan-based, also known as peer-to-peer (P2P), 
lending is the third type of crowdfunding. Platforms 
that facilitate P2P lending, e.g. LendingClub, 
typically perform credit risk assessment on the 
requests for unsecured personal loans and they 
connect borrowers with potential lenders. The key 
difference between loan-based and equity-based 
crowdfunding is the risk/reward profile of the 
participating investors. P2P lending typically 
involves relatively short-term loans (6-36 months), 
with a clearly defined interest rate that is set at the 
time of loan origination. Equity-based crowdfunding 
exposes the investors to much greater uncertainty in 
terms of both the time horizon for realizing a return 
on the investment, as well the likelihood of earning a 
financial return. Research on early stage venture 
investments suggests that it commonly takes 5-8 
years for the investors in early stage entrepreneurial 
ventures to achieve liquidity and more than half of 
the investments in early stage ventures result in a loss 
of the invested capital [27]. 
Whereas the participation in equity, rewards, and 
loan-based crowdfunding is typically motivated by 
self-interest [5], there are also crowdfunding 
platforms, e.g. Kiva.org, that facilitate philanthropic 
activities. Donors on the Kiva platform provide funds 
to support entrepreneurs in developing countries. 
This activity is primarily altruistic – the donors have 
no financial incentives to participate on the platform. 
Table 1 summarizes the key differences between 
different types of crowdfunding. 
 
Table 1. Capital provider motivations, risks and 
liquidity horizons across crowdfunding categories 
 Donation-
based CF 
Rewards-
based CF 
Loan-
based 
CF 
Equity-
bases CF 
Capital 
provider 
motivation 
Altruism Product 
or service 
Earned 
interest 
Equity 
appreciation 
Risks None Product 
or service 
not 
delivered 
Loss of 
principal 
Loss of 
investment 
Liquidity 
horizon 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
6-36 
months 
5-8 years 
 
 While equity crowdfunding is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the United States, a number of other 
countries have had a head start. Equity crowdfunding 
has always been legal in Australia and the Australian 
Small Scale Offering Board (ASSOB) has helped 
entrepreneurs raise over $146 million since its launch 
in 2005 [4]. Ahlers et al. [3] examined factors that 
influence equity crowdfunding success on ASSOB 
and found that provision of financial projections by 
the entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs retaining a 
greater share of equity were positively associated 
with crowdfunding success.  
Equity crowdfunding regulation has advanced 
rapidly in Europe and each country in the European 
Union has at least one equity crowdfunding platform 
[12]. Several studies have explored factors that can 
affect the success of equity crowdfunding on the 
European platforms. Lukkarinen et al. [25] examined 
an equity crowdfunding platform in Finland and 
found that the size of the entrepreneurs’ social 
networks had a positive effect on the likelihood of 
successful fundraising, while the minimum 
investment amount required from each potential 
investor had a negative effect on the likelihood of 
success. Vismara [45,46] explored success factors on 
Crowdcube, an equity crowdfunding platform based 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and found that social 
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connections, equity retention and engagement of 
professional investors were positively associated with 
successful campaigns. Professional investor 
involvement was also identified as an important 
factor by Ralcheva and Roosenbloom who also 
studied Crowdcube [38].  
Focusing on equity crowdfunding in the United 
States, Agrawal et al. [1] presented a theoretical 
analysis highlighting the potential for the 
crowdfunding platforms to amplify information 
asymmetries that commonly exist in early stage 
ventures. Entrepreneurs typically know more about 
the prospects of a business venture than the potential 
investors and the information asymmetry presents a 
challenge in the evaluation of investment 
opportunities. However, in a subsequent study, the 
authors found that angel investors often pool their 
resources and form syndicates, wherein a well-known 
investor takes the lead role in performing the due 
diligence on potential investments, thus providing a 
solution to the information asymmetry challenges [2]. 
Focusing on Title II equity crowdfunding platforms, 
Mamonov et al. [26] showed that real estate projects 
are particularly successful in raising funding from the 
accredited investors under Title II. Table 2 
summarizes the insights of empirical studies that 
examined equity crowdfunding in different 
geographies. 
 
Table 2. Empirical studies in equity CF 
Authors / Context Insights 
Ahlers et al. (2015) [3] 
 
Australian Small Scale 
Offering Board 
 
Provision of financial 
projections and entrepreneurs 
retaining greater equity 
percentage are associated with 
successful fundraising. 
Lukkarinen et al. (2016) 
[25] 
 
Finland 
The size of the minimum 
investment (negative effect) 
and early finding from 
entrepreneurs’ private networks 
are associated with successful 
fundraising. 
Vismara (2016) [45] 
 
Crowdcube, UK 
Equity retention and number of 
social connections in social 
networking sites are predictive 
of funding success. 
Vismara (2016) [46] 
 
Crowdcube, UK 
Engagement of well-known 
investors has a positive effect 
on project success. 
Ralcheva and 
Roosenbloom (2016) 
[38] 
 
Crowdcube, UK 
Professional investor 
involvement and patents are 
associated with success. 
Catalini et al. (2016) [2] 
 
Angel.co – Title II 
Syndicate driven investments 
dominate the angel investor 
oriented equity crowdfunding 
equity crowdfunding platform. 
Mamonov et al., (2017) 
[26] 
 
Title II equity 
crowdfunding platforms 
Real estate investments are 
disproportionately more 
successful in Title II 
crowdfunding. 
 
3. Research framework and hypotheses  
The goal of the present study is to understand 
factors that can impact the success of equity 
crowdfunding under Title III. Title III equity 
crowdfunding is open to both accredited and non-
accredited investors. While little is known about the 
criteria that may influence non-accredited investor 
decision making in this context, research has 
suggested that faced with the uncertainty of 
investment decisions, less knowledgeable investors 
often take their cues from experts [20]. We expect 
that in Title III equity crowdfunding less 
sophisticated investors will follow the lead of 
business angels (accredited investors) who are also 
active in Title III equity crowdfunding platforms. 
Hence, we draw on research focusing on business 
angel investor decision making to develop the 
theoretical framework in our study. 
Research has shown that investors in informal 
risk capital markets focus on risks that fall into three 
general categories: market risk, execution risk and 
agency risk [6]. Market risk is the risk of losing 
money on an investment due to overall market 
factors.  Examples of market factors include 
competition, recession, political turmoil, and growth 
potential.  Many of these risks are external to the 
venture and outside the entrepreneur’s control.  
However, prior research has shown that market risk is 
the top reason why professional angel investor groups 
reject an investment [6,28].  When analyzing market 
risk, investors typically consider the stage of the 
venture in question.  Market risk is reduced as the 
venture proceeds from idea/concept to prototype to 
actual sales.  
A venture that is just in the idea/concept phase 
has the most market risk because its market potential 
has not been proven.  As the venture moves from the 
idea/concept stage to the prototype/minimal viable 
product stage some uncertainty about the product is 
removed.  However, the market risk still remains 
high. 
A venture needs to show that its product/service 
can succeed in the market.  It can accomplish this by 
selling its product/service directly to consumers for a 
business-to-consumer (B2C) venture or signing 
corporate customers for a business-to-business (B2B) 
venture [13].  Successful consumer product launches 
and signings of marquee corporate clients are 
Page 3403
commonly interpreted by risk capital investors as 
market validation [28] and we expect a similar 
behavior among the investors in the context of equity 
crowdfunding platforms. 
H1a. Ventures that completed product/service 
development are more likely to raise funding in 
online equity crowdfunding campaigns than early 
stage ventures (ideas and prototypes). 
H1b. Ventures that have large corporate clients 
are more likely to raise funding in online equity 
crowdfunding campaigns than ventures lacking 
such clients. 
 
Prior research has shown that investors consider 
whether the venture represents a disruptive or 
incremental innovation as a criterion for providing 
funding [29]. Startups that offer only incremental 
innovations are unlikely to succeed in competition 
with established incumbents.  This is due to the fact 
that incumbents typically have greater resources (i.e., 
financial, marketing, R&D, etc.) than startups and 
can react aggressively to incremental innovation.  For 
example, the incumbent can accelerate their R&D 
cycle to develop and market a similar or superior 
incremental innovation [21].  
Startups based on a disruptive innovation are 
more likely to attract funding [9]. While not a perfect 
proxy for disruptive innovation, patents provide 
strong evidence of significant practical innovation 
[15]. Patents also provide protection for startups from 
potential imitation by incumbents and thus they can 
offer a source of sustainable competitive advantage. 
H2. Ventures that hold patents are more likely to 
raise funding in online equity crowdfunding 
campaigns than ventures that do not have patents. 
 
Execution risk is the risk that a venture’s business 
plans will not succeed in the market.  In order to 
execute their plans successfully, startup ventures 
require a diverse portfolio of skills, such as, product 
development, marketing, operations, financial 
management, etc. [24]. No individual entrepreneur is 
likely to possess all of the skills required to make the 
venture a success.  Prior research indicates that 
venture capitalists are more likely to invest in startup 
teams over single entrepreneurs [17].  In addition,  
venture capitalists prefer teams that are comprised of 
both young entrepreneurs with new ideas and more 
seasoned executives who can guide the venture to 
successful execution of its plans [17]. 
Research has shown that angel investors consider 
an entrepreneur’s prior industry experience and prior 
entrepreneurial experience when deciding whether to 
invest [28]. Potential investors value prior 
entrepreneurial experience due to the fact that in 
order to realize financial reward from an early stage 
investment the venture must have an “exit” (buyout 
or public offering).  Entrepreneurs who have had 
previous successful exits understand the expectations 
of investors and have shown their ability to deliver 
financial rewards. 
H3a. Single entrepreneurs are less likely to 
successfully raise funding in online equity 
crowdfunding campaigns than entrepreneurial 
teams comprised of 2 or more members. 
H3b. Serial entrepreneurs are more likely to 
successfully raise funding in online equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. 
H3c. Entrepreneurs with prior experience in the 
target industry are more likely to raise funding in 
online equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
H3d. Larger entrepreneurial teams are more likely 
to successfully raise funding in online equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. 
 
The information asymmetry between the 
entrepreneurs and potential investors leads to agency 
risk.  Entrepreneurs know more about their business 
than potential investors.  This can lead to 
opportunism which is more common among younger, 
smaller firms [37].  Angel investors typically mitigate 
the agency risk by close involvement in the 
entrepreneurial ventures in which they invest.  
However, online platform-mediated investments 
allow for more geographically distant investments 
which makes active angel investor engagement in the 
entrepreneurial ventures very challenging [34].  In 
these cases, potential investors might rely on another 
angel investor or VC firm to take a lead role in 
closely monitoring the venture.  Research conducted 
on the angel-oriented, equity crowdfunding platform 
Angel.co has shown that successful fundraising is 
dominated by syndicate-based investments.  In this 
structure a well-known angel investor or VC takes 
the lead role – providing due diligence and close 
monitoring [2].  Therefore, we anticipate that 
companies that have funding from an experienced 
angel or VC are more likely to attract further funding 
from investors on equity crowdfunding platforms. 
H4a. Ventures that have already attracted funding 
from established angel investors would be more 
likely to successfully raise funding in online 
equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
H4b. Ventures that have already attracted funding 
from professional venture capital firms would be 
more likely to successfully raise funding in online 
equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur have been 
shown to be an important screening factor for angel 
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and VC investors [8].  For example, prior research 
has noted the importance of entrepreneurial passion 
and determination as well as trustworthiness in 
successful venture fundraising [35].  Entrepreneurs 
that do not show passion and determination 
undermine investor confidence that the entrepreneur 
can overcome the many challenges faced in 
shepherding a venture to success and then an exit.  
Investors also want to feel that the entrepreneur will 
be a trustworthy steward of any money invested [28]. 
Entrepreneurs may find it challenging to 
communicate their various positive characteristics to 
investors in a computer-mediated context.  Prior 
research in rewards-based crowdfunding has shown 
that video is an important communication tool in 
computer-mediated communication [31]. We expect 
that successful entrepreneurs will make use of video 
in communicating with potential investors in equity 
crowdfunding platforms. 
H5a. Ventures that use video in their project 
descriptions will be more likely to successfully 
raise funding in online equity crowdfunding 
campaigns. 
H5b. Ventures that use video featuring the 
founders in their project descriptions will be more 
likely to successfully raise funding in online 
equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
We obtained the dataset for our study by 
collecting project-level details across sixteen Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms. We collected project 
descriptions as well as the information about the 
amount of capital sought and funds committed by the 
investors to each project. Appendix A provides a 
summary of the number of projects and total capital 
commitments for each of the platforms in our dataset. 
Project success is the dependent variable in our 
study. Following the accepted practice [3], we 
defined project success, as a venture raising the 
minimum amount of capital that was sought. 69 of 
133 (51.9%) projects in our dataset were successful 
in achieving their funding goals. 
We engaged two graduate assistants with 
experience in entrepreneurship and equity 
crowdfunding to review the project descriptions and 
code the data. The coders met with the authors to 
resolve coding differences. Table 3 summarizes the 
independent variable and co-variate coding schema 
and it also provides the descriptive statistics for the 
data in our study. 
To assess the effects of the independent variables 
on the project equity crowdfunding success we ran a 
series of logistic regression models. We relied on 
SPSS version 22 to conduct the analysis. In the next 
section, we discuss the results. 
 
Table 3. Variable coding schema and descriptive 
statistics 
Variable name / Coding schema Descriptive 
statistics 
Single_entrepreneur 
 
1 – single entrepreneur 
0 – otherwise 
21.8% of the 
ventures were led 
by a single 
entrepreneur 
Industry_experience 
 
Founder(s) have experience in the 
target industry:  
1 – yes, 0 – no 
95.5% of the 
ventures had 
founders with 
industry experience 
in the target 
industry 
Serial_entrepreneur 
 
At least one of the founders has prior 
entrepreneurial experience: 
1 – yes, 0 – no 
9% of the ventures 
were led by serial 
entrepreneurs 
Team_size 
 
The number of people involved in 
the venture.  
Min = 1 
Max = 22 
Average = 3.9 
St. dev = 2.5 
Venture_stage 
 
Idea – venture is at the idea/concept 
stage 
Beta – a beta or a prototype has been 
developed 
Product – the product or service has 
been developed and it is offered to 
potential clients 
Idea = 5 
Beta =  65 
Product = 63 
 
Angel_investors 
 
1 – the company has received 
funding from a professional angel 
investor 
0 – none 
19.5% of the 
ventures in our 
dataset had 
received funding 
from professional 
angel investors 
VC_investment 
 
1 – the company has received 
funding from a venture capital firm 
0 – none 
18% of the 
ventures in our 
dataset had 
received funding 
from VC investors 
Video 
 
1 – venture description contains a 
video 
0 – none 
84.9% of the 
venture funding 
solicitations 
included a video 
Entrepreneur_video 
 
1 – founder(s) appears in the video 
0 – the founder(s) is not in the video 
60.15% of the 
solicitations 
included a video 
that featured the 
founder(s) 
Patents_issued 
 
1 – the company has received 
patents 
12.8% of the 
ventures had 
obtained patents 
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0 – none 
Minimum issue amount 
 
The minimum amount of funding 
sought by the venture, in $ 
Min: $10,000 
Max: $15 mil 
Mean: $349,307 
Mode: $100,000 
St. dev.: $1.3 mil 
 
5. Results 
 
In the first step of our analysis, we examined 
separate effects of market, execution, agency and 
computer-mediation effects on the likelihood of 
venture success in raising funding in online Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms.  
Focusing on the market risks, we found that the 
company development stage had an effect on the 
success of a crowdfunding campaign. Companies in 
the beta/prototype stage were less likely to raise 
funding (B= -0.84, p<0.05) than companies that 
completed product development. There was no 
statistically significant effect for the companies in the 
“idea” stage. This is likely due to the fact that there 
were only 5 such companies in our dataset. We also 
found a significant positive effect of a company 
having corporate clients in its portfolio (B=0.88, 
p<0.05). These results lend support for H1a and H1b. 
Although 12.9% of the companies in our dataset held 
patents, we found no statistically significant effects 
of the patents on the likelihood of successful equity 
crowdfunding. H2 was not supported. The results are 
shown in Model 1 column in Table 4. 
Focusing on the execution risks, we found a 
statistically significant negative effect for single-
entrepreneur led ventures (B= -1.15, p<0.05) and a 
statistically significant positive effect for the size of 
the entrepreneurial team (B=0.251, p<0.01). These 
results provide support for H3a and H3d. We found 
no support for the effects of prior industry experience 
or serial entrepreneurial experience on the success of 
equity crowdfunding in our data. H3b and H3c were 
not supported. The results are shown in Model 2 
column in Table 4. 
Next, we examined the effects of professional 
investor involvement in the mitigation of agency 
risks that commonly exist in early stage ventures. We 
found that when examined individually, both 
professional angel investor involvement (B=1.6, 
p<0.01) and venture capitalist participation (B=2.6, 
p<0.001) were positively associated with the success 
in equity crowdfunding, however only VC 
participation was statistically significantly correlated 
with the likelihood of success in the model that 
included both factors. The results provide support for 
H4a and H4b. Model 3 column in Table 4 provides 
the summary of effects. 
Finally, we assessed the full model that included 
market, execution and agency risks as well as the use 
of video to communicate with the potential investors 
in equity crowdfunding platforms. We found that in 
the full model the company stage, the size of the 
entrepreneurial team, professional angel investor and 
VC involvement retained their effects on the success 
of equity crowdfunding under Title III. These results 
remain significant after controlling for the size of the 
investment required by the companies and the month 
when the fundraising campaign was launched. The 
results are summarized in the Full model column in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The effects of market, execution and 
agency risks in Title III equity crowdfunding  
  
Model 
1: 
Market 
risk 
Model 
2: 
Executio
n risk 
Model 
3: 
Agenc
y risk 
Full 
model 
Company stage         
idea ns     ns 
beta / 
prototype  -0.84*      -0.78* 
product         
Corporate clients  0.88*     1.05* 
Patents ns     ns 
Single 
entrepreneur   -1.15*    -1.26* 
Serial 
entrepreneur   ns   ns 
Industry 
experience   ns   ns 
Team size   0.251*    0.25* 
Angel investors     ns  0.98* 
VC investors     2.3**  2.14* 
Video       ns 
Entrepreneur in 
video       ns 
ln(Minimum 
issue amount)        -0.89*** 
Campaign start 
month        ns 
 -2 log likelihood 164.2 168.2 158 113.2 
Cox & Snell R2 0.14 0.106 0.178 0.408 
Nagelkerke R2 0.19 0.141 0.238 0.537 
* - p < 0.05, *** - p < 0.001 
 
Unobserved project-level heterogeneity is a 
common concern in panel data analysis [33]. To 
assess the potential effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity we reanalyzed the full model using the 
mixed logit technique which accounts for the 
potential subpopulations in the data [16]. The results 
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of the mixed logit model affirmed the effects of the 
company stage, corporate clients, entrepreneurial 
team size and single entrepreneur led ventures as well 
the involvement of professional angel investors and 
venture capitalists on the success of equity 
crowdfunding under Title III.  
 
6. Discussion and implications 
6.1. Discussion 
 
In this study, we argued that less sophisticated 
non-accredited investors in Title III equity 
crowdfunding platforms would follow the more 
sophisticated investors’ lead. We drew on the risk 
capital framework and we evaluated the effects of 
market, execution and agency risks that are 
commonly considered by professional angel investors 
in traditional offline investments. Our results show 
that all three types of risks have an effect on the 
likelihood of a successful equity crowdfunding 
campaign in online Title III equity crowdfunding 
platforms. However, not all variables that we 
examined had an effect. 
In terms of market risks, we found that ventures 
that progressed to the product/service stage were 
more likely to be successful in raising funding in 
Title III platforms. 65% of the ventures in the 
product/service stage were successful, whereas only 
43% of the ventures in the beta/prototype stage were 
successful. None of the five ventures in the idea stage 
was successful in achieving the funding goal. These 
results indicate that investors in Title III platforms 
are willing to consider companies in the 
beta/prototype stage of development, however the 
companies that progressed to the product/service 
stage are more likely to achieve their funding goals. 
We also found that while patents had no statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of success, market 
traction evidenced in a company having corporate 
customers had a significant positive effect. 70.3% of 
companies that had corporate customers were 
successful in raising funding in Title III platforms 
that we examined. 
Focusing on the execution risk, we found that 
single entrepreneur ventures were successful only 
33.3% of the time in reaching the funding goal, 
whereas ventures with entrepreneurial teams were 
successful 53.2% of the time. The importance of 
entrepreneurial teams versus single entrepreneurs is 
consistent with the insights from research on angel 
investor decision making [6,44], however we found 
no support for prior entrepreneurial experience or 
industry experience effects on investment decisions. 
In our evaluation of agency risks in Title III 
crowdfunding, we focused on whether engagement of 
professional angel investors and/or venture capitalists 
is associated with a higher probability of successful 
equity crowdfunding. We found that both angel 
investor and VC participation had significant effects. 
80.8% of ventures that received funding from a 
prominent angel investor prior to soliciting funding 
via equity crowdfunding were successful. 91.7% of 
companies that received funding from a venture 
capital firm prior to the engagement in equity 
crowdfunding platforms were successful in hitting 
their funding targets. 
We also examined whether the use of video could 
help entrepreneurs overcome the challenges of 
communicating their passion and commitment to the 
success of the ventures to potential investors. 
Contrary to results from rewards-based crowdfunding 
[30], we found no significant effect for the use of 
video in investment solicitations. Unfortunately, our 
data does not yield clues as to why the use of video 
had no effect and further research will be required to 
understand how entrepreneurs can leverage rich 
media in communicating with investors in equity 
crowdfunding platforms. 
To evaluate the robustness of our model, we 
examined the effect of incorporating the funding goal 
amount and the month in which the equity 
crowdfunding campaign was launched on the 
likelihood of crowdfunding success as covariates in 
our model. The effects of the key variables in our 
model remained significant after the addition of these 
covariates to the model. Consistent with prior 
research in equity crowdfunding [45], we found a 
negative effect of the funding goal amount on the 
likelihood of a campaign’s success in our data. 
Further examination of the data revealed that 46 of 
133 ventures (35.4%) sought to raise less than 
$100,000 and 70% of these ventures were successful 
in raising the target capital. Whereas ventures 
seeking more than $500,000 were successful only 
33.4% of the time, and none of the ventures that 
sought to raise over $1 million was successful.  
In aggregate, our results suggest that investors in 
Title III crowdfunding platforms generally share their 
approach to potential investment evaluation with the 
professional angel investors. We find that investors in 
these platforms are perceptive to market, execution 
and agency risks. The investors prefer to fund 
companies that are headed by entrepreneurial teams 
(as opposed to a single entrepreneur). The investors 
also prefer companies that completed product or 
service development and are showing market traction 
by signing corporate customers.  Our results also 
indicate that investors in Title III equity 
crowdfunding platforms are looking for external 
validation of the ventures seeking funding and 
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management of agency risks in the form of traditional 
angel investor or VC involvement. These results 
imply that although Title III platforms are aimed at 
the less sophisticated non-accredited investors, the 
apparent patterns of investor decision making suggest 
that sophisticated investors play a key role in 
influencing the success of individual campaigns. 
 
6.2. Contributions to theory 
 
Our study makes a number of contributions to 
both theory and practice. Our first theoretical 
contribution is the adoption of the risk capital 
framework that was developed in the offline context 
[6] for the analysis of factors that can affect online 
venture equity crowdfunding success. The risk capital 
framework complements signaling and social capital 
perspectives that have been applied in studies of 
equity crowdfunding [3,10]. The risk perspective 
recognizes that understanding how investors evaluate 
potential investment opportunities is critical to 
entrepreneurs securing an investment. The risk 
perspective focuses on actual risk evaluation, 
whereas the signaling perspective addresses the 
question of how entrepreneurs can signal the fitness 
of their ventures to potential investors. Actual risks 
and what entrepreneurs may be able to signal to 
potential investors are distinct and therefore there is a 
need to understand the fundamental risks inherent to 
early stage ventures and how these risks affect 
investment decision in equity crowdfunding. 
Our second theoretical contribution stems from 
provision of empirical evidence that shows that 
investors in Title III equity crowdfunding platform 
share their approach to investment evaluation with 
traditional offline business angel investors. These 
results suggest that while the Title III goal was to 
open access to early stage venture investments to 
non-accredited investors, it is the sophisticated and 
likely accredited investors who play the critical role 
in venture fundraising success under Title III. These 
results contribute to the emerging stream of evidence 
on the importance of experts in equity crowdfunding 
decisions [20] and suggest that such behavior may 
reflect rational herding [47] wherein less 
sophisticated investors follow the lead of the more 
experienced business angels. 
 
6.3. Implications for practice 
 
Our findings also have implications for 
entrepreneurs and operators of the crowdfunding 
platforms as well as policy makers. The empirical 
insights emergent from our study suggest that Title 
III equity crowdfunding platforms can be a source of 
early capital for entrepreneurial ventures, however 
the amount of available capital tends to be relatively 
low – less than $1 million and more commonly less 
than $300,000. Given the relatively low amount of 
capital that can be raised in Title III platforms, these 
platforms are likely to be supplementary sources of 
funding for entrepreneurs. In other words, 
entrepreneurs seeking seed (typically $500,000 – $1 
million) or series A (typically $1-$5 million) funding, 
would likely need to engage with traditional angel 
investors as the primary source of funds and then 
possibly augment the fundraising via a Title III 
campaign. 
These observations also have implications for the 
operators of the Title III equity crowdfunding 
platforms. Provided that, at least at the moment, Title 
III platforms would be unlikely to serve as a singular 
source of seed or series A funds for new ventures, the 
platforms would benefit from close alignment with 
established angel investors and early stage venture 
capitalists in order to generate deal flow and sustain 
interest from potential non-accredited investors. In 
fact, WeFunder, the most successful platform in our 
dataset, emerged from Y Combinator, one of the best 
known venture accelerator programs that has a strong 
VC network [23]. 
Equity crowdfunding remains a hotly debated 
policy topic and Title III has received a fair share of 
criticism for coming up short in solving the challenge 
of easier access to funding for entrepreneurial 
ventures while also assuring investor protection 
[7,43]. The results of our study indicate that while 
Title III had a slower start compared to Title II [26], 
legislation has been adopted in practice and Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms are gaining traction. 
 
6.4. Limitations 
 
While we collected data across all known Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms, out dataset contains 
only 133 venture listings. It is known that several of 
the platforms included in our dataset remove 
unsuccessful campaigns from their sites, thus 
potentially biasing our results. However, our dataset 
does reflect the historical information that is actually 
available to potential investors on Title III platforms 
and 64 of 133 (48.1%) ventures did not reach the full 
target amount affording us an opportunity to examine 
the factors associated with fundraising success under 
Title III. Further research will be needed to 
reevaluate the insights that emerged in our study as 
Title III platforms continue to develop. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we sought to address the lack of 
knowledge on the success factors in equity 
crowdfunding open to non-accredited investors in the 
United States under Title III of the JOBS Act. We 
argued that because Title III platforms are open to 
both non-accredited and accredited investors, the 
accredited investors would lead the way and they 
would leverage established practices in investment 
evaluation by examining market, execution and 
agency risks associated with early stage venture 
investments. We examined the role of these factors 
using a dataset collected across sixteen Title III 
equity crowdfunding platforms. Our results indicate 
that investors in Title III platforms are cognizant of 
market, execution and agency risks, but they are also 
selective in which factors they consider. We found 
that ventures started by teams of entrepreneurs, 
which progressed to product/service development, 
signed corporate clients, and received funding from 
professional investors were more likely to be 
successful in raising funding in Title III equity 
crowdfunding platforms. The results suggest that 
Title III platforms complement, rather than replace 
the professional investor funding for entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
 
Appendix A 
 
Title III equity crowdfunding platforms 
Platform 
Number of 
projects 
Total capital 
commitments 
Crowdsourcefunded 2  0 
Crudefunders.com 1 112,950 
Dreamfunded.vc 1  0 
Flashfunders.com 8 138,188 
iBankers 2  0 
Jumpstartmicro 4 5,200 
Localstake 1 14,000 
Netcapital 2 13,925 
Nextseed.co 7 1,295,400 
Republic 4 185,502 
Seedinvest.com 5 291,613 
Startengine.com 17 1,318,732 
Trucrowd 5 37,333 
uFundingportal 18 30 
Centure.co 4 46,002 
Wefunder 43 7,857,725 
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